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Abstract: Trade, economists and trade theorists advise, is a mutually beneficial 
exercise.  Among this group, a particular set of advocates, claim that “Free Trade” is 
in the interest of all parties.  As will be demonstrated, Free Trade is not truly “free”  
but an exercise of foreign policy and the implementation of policies favouring wealthy 
corporate interest groups.  Free Trade is controlled by wealthy nations who have 
stacked the rules in favour of themselves, and in particular their corporate interests, 
and against the poor producers in poor nations.  This control is used contrary to 
fairness, economic and ecological logic.  Fair trade, by way of contrast, is an effort to 
balance the benefits of trade between the trading partners, and ensure that a fairer 
distribution of the surplus value created by trade ends up in the hands of those who 
most need it and produced the goods.  This paper looks at a trade agreement, the 
USA-Australia FTA which is well suited to a case study of the various aspects of trade 
theory, and in particular the fairness, economic and ecological aspects.  It deals with 
the peculiar situation of Australia, a developed, ally of the USA which happens to be 
located in a tropical climate. 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Australian  Trade Minister Mark Vaile described the USA-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement as a “once in a lifetime opportunity to integrate Australia with the world’s 
largest economy.”1 Once in a lifetime is a breath-taking description.  Does this trade 
agreement truly meet such standards?  Is there reality behind the rhetoric?  Similar 
rhetoric surrounds much of the discussion concerning international trade2. The WTO, 
NAFTA, and various other international trade treaties are presented to the public as 
monumental achievements to the benefit of the peoples of the various countries 
involved eliminating poverty and brining wealth to untold numbers.3
In part, such claims are part of the neo-classical economists’ neo-liberal political 
revolution in western societies in which governments are supposed to take a lesser 
role while permitting the efficiencies of private enterprise to deliver equivalent public 
goods and services at a lower cost.  This paper using the USA-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) as a case study will examine the trade aspects of the neo-classical 
economists’ neo-liberal political agenda, and in particular its economic and political 
claim that neo-liberal governments in the developed countries are following a free 
 
1 Quoted in Tim Harcourt, “The Australia United States Free Trade Agreements—what’s it all about: 
Balancing pros and cons of the trade deal—what’s it all about?”  Australian Trade Commission, 
www.austrade.gov.au/corporatel/layout/00,,_S1-1_CORPORXID29-2_2-3_PWB Many similar quotes 
can be found in L. Weiss, E. Thurbon, J. Mathews, How to kill a Country: Australia’s Devastating 
Trade Deal with the United States (2004), p. 5. 
2 Renato Ruggiero, the first director-general of the WTO, claimed that as a result of free trade “the 
potential for eradicating global poverty in the early part of the next [twenty-first] century—a utopian 
notion even a few decades ago, but a real possibility today” in “Whither the Trade System Next?,” in J. 
Bhagwati & M. Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond—Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel..  
See generally, Jagdish Bhagwati. Protectionism. (1985).  
3 Id. An opposite view--that international trade generates a significant economic loss-has been ably 
argued by Herman Daly, former economist at the World Bank and founder of the International Society 
for Ecological Economics.  Daly has argued that the free trade regime is undermining the planet’s 
ability to sustain life.  His work, Steady-State Economics, remains a landmark in the area of 
environment and economics. 
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trade agenda.  Further, it will examine whether the world’s dominant economy and 
dealing neo-liberal government would permit a benefit to those less powerful or less 
developed countries that would implement the neo-classical economists’ agenda.4
Finally, it examines the truth of their claim that trade patterns are dictated by 
rationality and efficiency. Obviously, using a case study significantly restricts the 
generalizability of any conclusion.  It is hoped, therefore, that this study serves as an 
illustration of an FTA in a peculiarly interesting instance, that of two neo-liberal 
nations in opposite hemispheres. 
 
As shall be demonstrated, various theories of trade indicate differing patterns in trade.  
One may ask, therefore, what rules determine the patterns and how do they do so?  
Perhaps as the neo-classicists suggest, trade follows natural advantages and economic 
rationalities.  In other words, it may be that where the ecological needs of specific 
commodities and economic realities dictate, trade flows in a predictable pattern based 
on that logic.  Alternatively, it may be suggested that trade patterns are limited to the 
relationships between the north and the south as suggested by the Brandt Line.  We 
may ask therefore: is trade between developed countries free trade, or is there yet a 
role to be played or a problem to be addressed as fair trade advocates claim?  Perhaps 
developed nations treat one another differently than they treat poor nations, or they 
may indeed continue a pattern of power exploiting the weak even among the 
developed nations.  The USA-Australia Free Trade Agreement offers an excellent 
opportunity to examine critically the economists’ and trade theorists’ claims about 
 
4 See A. Rands Barros “Challenges of Economic Development” Draft paper prepared for the discussion 
at the UNRISD meeting on The Need to Rethink Development Economics., 7-8 September 2001, Cape 
Town, South Africa, but a disturbing trend identified even in the 1970’s.  See, for example, Gunnar 
Myrdal, Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, March 17, 1975, 
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1974/myrdal-lecture.html
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free trade agreements: it is an agreement between two developed nations whose main 
differences are power and climate: tropical versus temperate.  
Both countries have a British heritage from which they received the English language, 
legal systems and basic economic policy.5 The USA is a developed country.6 It has 
the world’s largest economy, is the world’s largest international trading partner. 7 
Australia too is a developed country, but amounts to about one-fourteenth of the USA 
in terms of population and considerably less in terms of the size of its economy and 
trade.8 It understands its relationship with the USA to be a friendship.9 Its support of 
the USA’s, internationally condemned, illegal invasion of Iraq10 added considerable 
legitimacy to the “Coalition of the Willing.”11 
5 See Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang’s review of trade policies of Great Britain and the USA, in 
Ha-Joon Chang “Kicking Away the Ladder: The ‘Real’ History of Free Trade,” Foreign Policy In 
Focus, Dec. 2003. 
6 Both USA and Australia are ranked in the same category as “High Income” countries by the World 
Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm#High_income
7 In 2003 it was responsible for 9% ($724 bn of $7274 bn worldwide) of the world’s exports and 20% 
($1306 bn of $7557 bn worldwide) of the world’s imports.  WTO, World Trade Report 2004, “Trade 
and Trade Policy Developments: Recent Trends in International Trade and Policy Developments,” p. 7. 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr04_1a_e.pdf
8 In 2003 Australia had $70 bn exports and $88 bn imports. World Bank, Australia at a Glance.  
http://www.worldbank.org/cgi-
bin/sendoff.cgi?page=%2Fdata%2Fcountrydata%2Faag%2Faus_aag.pdf
9 L. Weiss, E. Thurbon, “Preliminary Submission to the Australian Senate Select Committee,” Enquiry 
of the Australian Senate Select Committee into the Free Trade Agreement Between Australia and the 
United States of America, 30 April 2004.  In the discussion of the countries and identifying various 
special interest groups, I am taking both Realist and Liberal approaches to International Relations,  see. 
R. Beck, “International Law and International Relations: The Prospects for Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration” in Beck, Arend and Vander Lugt eds, International  Rules: Approaches from 
International Law and international Relations. 
10 The UN has condemned the invasion. Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that the war was 
illegal.  “War Illegal—says Annan,” 16 Sept. 2004 BBC World News 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm For an example of the acrimony see Steven 
R. Weisman “A Long, Winding Road to a Diplomatic Dead End” March 17, 2003  New York Times  
See the discussion of the specious nature of the USA’s claims and self-contradictions in attempting to 
put its case forward, see J. Maogoto, Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives On The Use Of Force And 
The War On Terror, Chapter IV (forthcoming) (copy of manuscript on file with Author). 
11 Denominated as such by G.W. Bush. An indication of the skepticism of even this claim of willing 
cooperation can be seen in the mockery of the denomination as the “Coalition of the Bought”, or 
“Coalition of the Billing.” Australian negotiators sold the FTA to the public claiming this was part of 
the reason they were able to get the deal on the table, L. Weiss, E. Thurbon, J. Mathews, How to kill a 
Country: Australia’s Devastating Trade Deal with the United States (2004), pp 140-143 
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The USA-Australia Free Trade Agreement is important because it sharpens the focus 
on issues and complaints raised by weaker, poor southern countries against wealthy, 
powerful northern countries.   Wealthy northern countries, instead of addressing 
southern countries’ issues and complaints, often simply obfuscate the matter by 
reference to some aspect of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Policy, such as 
conditionality, and so avoid addressing the issue.12 Australia, however, is not such a 
nation, and accordingly the resulting FTA cannot be dismissed as a problematic 
consequence of international debtors complying with creditor imposed conditions or 
creditors’ other rights.  Further, this particular case makes it clear that powerful 
northern countries like the USA,13 are concerned only about the economic benefit of 
their own wealthy corporations, remain unconcerned with the broader negative 
economic and environmental impact of their trade policies, and will use their power to 
impose manifestly unfair trade agreements on weaker parties.14 Perhaps most 
striking, the USA will impose its will regardless of and even contrary to both 
economic and ecological rationality, which form the very basis for neo-classical 
economists’ drive for “Free Trade.”  I wish to declare from the outset that this piece is 
not “anti-USA” as the USA’s actions are no different from other empires of the past: 
however, whether it is done in the last century by the UK, two thousand years ago by 
Rome, or today by the USA, unfair trade is unfair.15 
12 Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade, globalization, and the fight against poverty, 126-128. 
http://www.maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=26032002105641.htm
13 The USA’s policies concerning trade and the use of violence to implement its policies are not unique, 
and indeed may be said to form part of imperial policies traditionally.  See for example, Lord 
Shelburne’s comment: “England prefers trade without domination where possible, but accepts trade 
with domination when necessary.” Quoted in R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, “The Imperialism of Free 
Trade,” 6 Economic History Review, (2nd series)  (1953) 1-15. 
14 The use of USA power is a central tenet of the Bush II Administration and has been a part of its 
policy since its inception.  In the words of Condoleezza Rice “Great powers do not mind their own 
business” in an article in which she advocates USA military adventures to spread America’s “universal 
values”.  C. Rice, Promoting the national interest, 79 Foreign Affairs, (2000), p. 49. 
15 See comment of Lord Shelburne above n. 13. 
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2) THE BASICS—TRADE, FAIR TRADE, FREE TRADE 
 
Trade is a contentious issue at the best of times as parties attempt to maximize their 
share of the surplus value created in any given transaction.  Parties doubt each other’s 
intentions and the truthfulness of the other party’s information16—and even after a 
deal is negotiated, parties suffer from buyer’s remorse, wondering whether in fact 
they received the best deal.17 All trade depends on the perception of value: parties 
will trade where one party values its goods less than it values the goods of the other 
party, and the other party values in the reverse.  In other words, each party perceives 
the value of the other’s goods as being greater than the value it places on its own 
goods.18 The attractiveness of alternative distributions cause us to engage in the 
process of trade continually, never reaching the ultimate equilibrium economists posit 
as the point of General Equilibrium Theory.19 
For trade to occur, in other words, it must be mutually beneficial to induce the parties 
to engage in it and hence, in some way “fair.”  If trade is by definition fair, and free 
trade is simply forcing the government to extricate itself from introducing distortions 
into the marketplace, what can be the objection to free trade? How could it be 
anything other than “fair”?  If these two questions are based on correct premises, then 
there can be no cause for complaint and there can be no basis for fair trade advocates. 
 
16 R. Lewicki, Negotiations, (2003) 
17 Ibid. 
18 R. Malloy, Law and Market Economy (2002) 
19 See, for example, John R. Hicks – Prize Lecture, The Mainspring of Economic Growth Lecture to 
the memory of Alfred Nobel, April 27, 1973, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1972/hicks-
lecture.html
55256-text.native.1157935488 9
The argument presented in the previous paragraph is platitudinous at best.  Oxfam, 
arguably one of the world’s most famous NGO’s, has recently released a study on 
trade.  Its authors observe:  
 The international trading system is not a force of nature. It is a system of 
exchange, managed by rules and institutions that reflect political choices. Those 
choices can prioritise the interests of the weak and vulnerable, or they can 
prioritise the interests of the wealthy and powerful…. Trade is reinforcing 
global poverty and inequality because the international trading system is 
managed to produce these outcomes. The rules of the game reflect the power of 
vested interests.20 
In other words, it is abundantly clear outside of the sheltered offices of trade 
ministers, trade negotiators and big business executives, and particularly those of the 
wealthy nations that the current system of rules is an unmitigated disaster for the vast 
majority of the world’s population.21 
As indicated within, neo-liberal politicians “free trade” has little to do with actually 
reducing barriers to trade where the barriers benefit the rich countries, but much to do 
with marketing the products of wealthy countries in the markets of poorer countries 
while maintaining protections for their own producers at home.  Knowledge of this 
fact is so wide spread that the WTO talks at Cancun, Mexico in 2003 halted for this 
very reason,22 and indeed had been written about in advance.23 The poor countries 
simply refused any further participation until their concerns were addressed.  In 
particular, they insisted that the wealthy nations honour their commitments to 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 “unmitigated disaster” is Stiglitz’ term.  See Stiglitz, Globalization, and its Discontents, p. 20.  
Numerous studies have attempted to demonstrate to the contrary that trade has helped reduce poverty.  
The problem with these studies is that they fail to consider the distribution of wealth in the poor 
countries, nor the ecological damage, nor damage to democratic institutions, nor the increased 
populations, Including pundits like David Brooks of the NY Times “The Good News about poverty,”  
NY Times 24 Nov. 2004, 
22 WTO website  
23 R. H. Steinberg and T. Josling, “ When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural 
Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge, “ 6(2) J. of Intl Econ. Law, (2003). 
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reducing agricultural subsidies minimal though they may be and make further 
commitments.   
 
In response to this united action by the third world, instead of fulfilling promises, the 
developed nations of the G-7 scrambled to bring to the fore an idea first raised by Paul 
Martin, the then Minister of Trade for Canada—the notion of a G-20.24 The notion is 
to expand the G-7 to include some of the larger developing countries.  To many it is a 
transparent effort to implement a divide and conquer strategy among members of the 
third world.25 
3) INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
International trade has been a part of human history for thousands of years.  Evidence 
of trade between nations exists in the pre-Hispanic civilizations in meso-America, 
where nations traded for precious green stones, in Polynesia where goods and cultural 
artefacts were traded between islanders as signs of friendship, in the spread of 
Buddhism from its home in northern India throughout China and South East Asia, to 
the ancient Phoenician mariners who traded throughout the eastern Mediterranean, 
even to Sumer’s connections with India, perhaps some 1,000 years prior to the rise of 
Egypt’s pyramids in Giza.  Arguably the oldest known international trade was 
 
24 ??? 
25 Walden Bello and Aileen Kwa “G 20 Leaders Succumb to Divide-and-Rule Tactics: The Story 
behind Washington’s Triumph in Geneva” http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/wto/Updates/44.htm
See also, Yuill Herbert, “Divide and Conquer: Bilateral Trade Agreements,” Dominion April 2, 2004. 
As noted by The Economist magazine in “Progress at last, but still a long way to go” Aug 2nd 2004, 
The Economist Global Agenda concerning the Doha Round “The details of the framework agreement 
suggest that the rich countries are now prepared to pay a price to ensure access to the markets of the 
bigger, more attractive developing nations, and that price is the freeing-up of their own agricultural 
markets. Meanwhile, the poorest countries, in being relieved of many tariff-cutting obligations, have 
opted out of the process. So, though the Doha round is back on track, the WTO has, in effect, split into 
two tiers: one for those countries that are fully engaged in the round, and one for those that are little 
more than bystanders.” 
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conducted by the Australian Aboriginals with the Macassans in the northern parts of 
Australia.  Various explanations for international trade have been given.  
 
a) Trade theory 
Modern trade theory, explaining the motivations, directions and goods traded, is 
usually traced back to Adam Smith.  Smith held that nations traded on the basis of 
“absolute advantage.”26 That is, nations that have pastures produce sheep for wool, 
whereas nations with good vineyards and appropriate climate easily produce wine.  
These nations trade wool for wine.  David Ricardo is credited with refining Smith’s 
theory with a theory known as “comparative advantage.”27 Ricardo pointed out that 
where fewer labour inputs were required to produce the same goods in two countries, 
trade can be beneficial, even where one country had an absolute advantage in both 
goods to be traded.  Further advances in trade theory were made by Heckscher-Ohlin 
who took factor proportions into consideration,28 by Samuelson and Jones whose 
Specific Factors model took into account the immobility of certain factors,29 and more 
recently,  as advocated by Krugman, The Standard Model, a much more sophisticated 
model which considers multiple factors including immobility, the “relationship 
between production possibility frontier and the relative supply curve, the relationship 
between relative prices and relative demand, determination of world equilibrium, and 
the effect of terms of trade.”30 Current international trade indicates that a critical 
component of understanding trade is market access.31 
26 P. Krugman, M. Obstfelt, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 6th ed. (2003), 20-24. 
27 On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1819) 
28 B. Ohlin, Interregional and International Trade (1933) modified and expanded by Heckscher 
29 Krugman, above n. 16, 38-66. 
30 Ibid, 94.  For criticism, See D. R. Davis, D. E. Weinstein, “Market Access, Economic Geography 
and Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Assessment” National Bureau of Economic Research, April 
1998. 
31 Ibid. 
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i) Free Trade 
All of the foregoing trade theory is premised on a notion of free-trade.  This basis 
leads to a consideration of what free trade is, from both economic and political 
perspectives. 
(1) Economic Theory 
Free trade as advanced by the trade theorists just noted is the notion that the most 
beneficial outcomes for the populace will be realized when the supply of goods is 
permitted to flow freely to meet demand without government intervention via such 
devices as tariffs, quotas and other non-tariff barriers.  Its advocates offer great 
promise.  Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank, outlining the 
arguments for free trade writes that: “opening up to international trade has helped 
many countries grow far more quickly that they would otherwise have done…. 
Because of globalization many people in the world now live longer than before and 
their standard of living is far better.”32 This is the promise of free trade.  It was 
developed once the disastrous beggar-thy-neighbour policies—policies which 
attempted to support domestic industries and economy at the expense of neighbouring 
countries—were identified as harmful and causative with respect to the economic 
hardships and a forum for their elimination was set up.33 The current free trade 
regime (trade which favours lower levels of government intervention in the market) 
follows from the post-Depression and post World War II arrangement of the GATT. 
This was a coordinated and united effort among several nations to realize the benefits 
 
32 J. Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 4. 
33 Ibid., 15-16. 
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of trade by reducing tariffs jointly, on the theory that unilateral reductions would be 
disastrous for countries doing so on an individual basis.34 
Accordingly, free trade view appears justified,35 at least in terms of neo-classical 
economic theory.  Broader measures used by ecological economists indicate that 
much trade is in fact an economic negative,36 and indeed, this whole historical 
reconstruction appears to be a myth.37 Nations, 38 according to the neo-classicists, 
should engage in free trade for their own advantage to increase their economies. In 
political practice, however, trade does not follow the neo-classicists’ theory. 
(2) Political Reality 
Although its advocates have coopted the moniker “free trade”39 actual trade appears 
to be quite different,  Consider for example, that the self-proclaimed “leader” of free 
trade, the USA, “has imposed more dumping penalties against low-priced imports 
than… any other government in the world”40 and in the years 1993-1996 implemented 
61 laws and unilateral executive actions imposing economic sanctions for foreign 
policy purposes, against 34 countries representing 2.3 billion people, being 19% of 
the world’s markets.41 Krugman and Obstfelt, citing a study by economists Baldwin 
 
34 The argument that unilateral reductions are harmful to the country doing so do not appear to be borne 
out in theory or practice, as most countries tend to do so.  On the theory aspect, see J. Bhagawati, 
Going Alone. 
35 Krugman above n. 16, p. 21-23.  
36 H. Daly, above n. 2. 
37 See the excellent study by Chang, above n. 5. 
38 Again, the neo-classicists appear to ignore the fact that 2/3 of world trade occurs within multinational 
corporations, and as such is not susceptible to the national trading theories upon which they rely.  G. 
Bird and R. Rajan, “Economics Globalization: How Far and How Much Further? Adelaide University: 
Centre for International Economics Studies, Discussion Paper 0117, 2001, p. 3. 
39 Quotation marks will be used around “free trade” throughout the balance of this paper when referring 
to this politicized version of trade. 
40 Bovard, The Fair Trade Fraud, (19991) 110.  
41 National Association of Manufacturers (March 1997) A Catalog of new US Unilateral Economic 
Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes 1993-1996.  Cited in W. Pengilley, “United States Self Interest: 
A Major Impediment to Agreement on the Principles of International Competition and its 
Enforcement,”  1(2) J. of International Commercial Law (2002) 187-228., p. 200.  For the USA State 
Department’s justification of the use of sanctions for foreign policy see Victor Comras, “Economic 
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and Magee,42 observe: “it’s hard to makes sense of actual trade policy, if you assume 
that governments are genuinely trying to maximize national welfare.  On the other 
hand, actual trade policy does make sense if you assume that special interest groups 
can buy influence.”43 In fact, Krugman has concluded that international trade as it is 
currently structured is not based on economics, at all, but on politics.44 Essentially, 
then, trade is set up for and dominated by special interest groups—the large multi-
national corporations, and financial interests,45 and for the political purposes of 
subjugation of other nations.46 Such being the case, it is exceedingly important that 
the politics of “free trade” be explicated and debated.  Unfortunately, it is not.  This 
matter will be brought up and discussed later. 
ii) Fair Trade 
Fair trade is an effort to bring the element of fairness discussed earlier back to trade 
and to bring focus to the political aspects of trade.  It recognizes that there is no 
fairness in the current system in which weaker or impoverished nations find their 
protections are beaten down in rushed liberalization schemes imposed by the wealthy 
nations at the behest of their financiers.47 The hypocrisy of this situation is 
exacerbated when one realizes that these very same protectionist schemes were 
critical in permitting the developed nations to achieve their developed economic 
 
Sanctions and U.S. Foreign Policy” Remarks to the Open Forum Washington, DC February 25, 2002 
http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/9128.htm
42 R. Baldwin, and Christopher S. Magee (2000). Explaining congressional voting on trade bills in the 
1990’s: from NAFTA Approval to Fast-Track Defeat. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics. 
43 Above n 16, p. 233. 
44 P. Krugman, “The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade”, The American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings 83, (1996) 83(2) 362-366. 
45 Stiglitz,, above n. 11, p. 9-10, 15-20, 63. et passim. 
46 Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 195. 
47 Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 16-17. 
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status.48 Perhaps worse, the strong nations maintain those same protections today, 
long after they have served their developmental purpose.49 
(1) Economic Theory 
Fair trade advocates do not categorically reject international trade.  They acknowledge 
benefits that may be had from international trade but recognize that rapid 
liberalization does not work.  As Stiglitz writes: 
most of the advanced industrial countries—including the United States and 
Japan—had built up their economics by wisely and selectively protecting 
some of their industries until they were strong enough to compete with foreign 
companies.  While blanket protection has often not worked for countries that 
have tried it, neither has rapid trade liberalization.  Forcing a developing 
country to open itself up to imported products that would compete with those 
produce by certain of its industries… can have disastrous consequences—
socially and economically.50 
Furthermore, they accept that there is a role for some government protection of infant 
industries and developing manufacturing and other industries in certain instances.51 
What they reject is “free trade.” As Stiglitz observes, “The free market ideology 
should be replaced with analysis based on economic science, with a more balanced 
view of the role of government drawn from an understanding of both the market and 
government failure.”52 
(2) Political Reality  
Essentially, fair trade advocates recognize the scarcity of fairness where small, less 
developed countries are negotiating with the proverbial 800 pound gorilla.  “Free 
 
48 See Chang, above n. 5.  See also, R. Wade, “What strategies are viable for developing countries 
today? The World Trade Organization and the shrinking of ‘development space.’”   Review of 
International Political Economy (forthcoming).D. Rodrick,  See also D. Rodrick “Making openness 
work: investment strategies” in D. Rodrick ed., The New Global Economy and Developing Countries 
(1999), World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993), see also, J. 
Stiglitz “From Miracle to Crisis to Recovery: Lessons from Four Decades of East Asian Experience” In 
J. Stiglitz and S. Yusuf eds. Rethinking the East Asian Miracle (2001). L. Wallach and P. Woodall, 
Whose Trade Organization? The Comprehensive Guide To The WTO. 
49 Id.  
50 Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 16-17 
51 Ibid, pp. 244-252.  
52 Ibid, 250.  
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Trade” advocates calumniate those who disagree with them by calling them “angry 
left”, diagnosing a pseudo psychiatric condition “globaphobes” suffering from 
“undying paranoia about American imperialism and global business.”53 They further 
claim that fair traders oppose all trade.  As just indicated, fair trade advocates 
recognize that trade can provide important advantages to both poor and rich countries 
and their people;54 however, fair trade advocates acknowledge that in such 
relationships, the strong attempt to take advantage of the weak, the rich take 
advantage of the poor, and especially, that current rules favour inequitable 
distributions from the gains from trade. 55 Specifically, the rules in their current form 
transfer wealth from the poor to the rich.56 
As the NGO Oxfam, in its extensive study Rigged Rules and Double Standards 
advises: “The problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the 
needs and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favour of 
the rich.” 57 The authors continue:  
the same [wealthy] governments use their trade policy to conduct what 
amounts to robbery against the world's poor. When developing countries 
export to rich country markets, they face tariff barriers that are four times 
higher than those encountered by rich countries. Those barriers cost them 
$100bn a year - twice as much as they receive in aid.58 
Advocates of fair trade recognize the unfairness of the current trading rules and seek 
to have the rules changed to be fairer.   
 
53 Tony Parkinson “Let’s rid the free trade debate of anti-Americanism” The Age, 13, Feb, 2004. cited 
in Weiss, above, n. 14, p. 151. 
54 “Trade as a force for poverty reduction” Ch. 2 Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade, 
globalization, and the fight against poverty.  47-63. 
http://www.maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=26032002105641.htm
55 Id. 
56 Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 166-180. 
57 Rigged Rules above, n. 15, Executive Summary.  
58 Ibid.  
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There is irony in the use developed countries make of the term “fair” in discussions of 
trade.  At times, it is used as an excuse to exclude cheap goods from poor countries, 
allegedly “dumped” by those poor countries—although there has yet to be a single 
case proved where a poor country has dumped product on a developed country.59 By 
alleging dumping, wealthy countries can invoke countervailing duties against the 
developing nation and essentially kill that nation’s developing industry during the 
time the case works through the system.  Such actions, however, are not reserved 
exclusively to protect the wealthy from the poor developing nations.  The notion of 
fair trade has been a major contention between the USA and Japan and resulted in 
significant sanctions and acrimony between the nations.  As Pengilley observes: 
“When it comes to international trade, … even developed nations have erected a 
veritable barrage of barriers which prevent or severely inhibit even the most basic acts 
of trade taking place or taking place on anything near a level playing field.”60 We 
shall return to this later.  
 
4) FAIRNESS  
 
As just indicated, trade as it is currently structured is anything but fair.61 Fairness 
itself, however, is a problematic term.  It has different connotations in law, policy, 
economics, and ethics.  Essentially, where fairness is a matter of justice in 
distribution, there are two competing approaches.62 One approach examines merit, 
essentially focusing on justice from the perspective of dessert—that is, those who 
 
59 Legal victory in a dumping action is having met the legal criteria which can be quite unrelated to the 
actual economic facts of the case.  
60 Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 204. 
61 S. Suranovic, , "International Trade Fairness," The International Economics Study Center, © 1997-
2001, http://internationalecon.com/fairtrade/index.html. 
62 See Benedict Sheehy, Distributive Justice in Law and Economics.  Working paper on file with the 
author. 
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have some meritorious characteristics, or engage in some particular meritorious 
activity deserve a particular proportion of the resource(s) in question.   The second 
approach focuses on the equality of all humanity.  This approach starts from the 
premise that all humans are of equal value and then evaluates arguments for 
distributions which vary from equality.63 
a) Fairness in International Trade  
In the context of international trade, fairness has a slightly different character.  Indeed 
fair to one country or one economist is undoubtedly unfair to another, depending, of 
course on which dimension one focuses on, and on the perspective one takes.  For 
example, a neo-classical economist is likely to favour Maximum Benefit Fairness 
whereas an ecological economist may have a greater concern for Distributional 
Fairness.  The USA is notorious for its “fairness” complaints under s. 301 of its Trade 
Act 1974,64 which permits USA corporations to instigate investigations alleged unfair 
trade practices by foreign corporations by the US Dept. of Trade.  These 
investigations are initiated against countries trading with the USA in competition with 
the USA’s domestic corporations.  Although in all likelihood contrary to the USA’s 
WTO commitments, the USA has thus far managed to escape WTO censure of this 
law.65 
63 J. Feinberg, (1973) “Economic Income” in Social Philosophy, Prentice Hall, p. 107. Reprinted in 
Robert White, (1993), Business Ethics: A Philosophical Reader.
64 For an accessible commentary on the section, see the Counsel for the US Dept of Commerce’s 
summary at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/301.html (now 19 USC s. 2411) 
65 The USA’s hide and seek game with Super 301 and Special 301 (additional 301 provisions that are 
enacted and withdrawn periodically) have not been reviewed by the WTO.  The limited review of the 
law in the EU complaint (European Communities (WT/DS152/1)) leaves several important questions 
outstanding. It is not at all clear that even if the WTO did censure the US for this law that the USA 
would in fact accept the ruling, particularly in light of its recently increased disregard for international 
law & institutions.  See R. Steinberg and T. Josling, “When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC 
and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge”  6(2) J. of Internaiotnal Economic Law 
(2003) 369-417. 
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Nobel laureate in economics, Amartya Sen argues that fairness in international trade 
is often miscast in debates concerning globalization and development.  He observes 
that the question is often put as “are the poor getting poorer or richer?”66 essentially, a 
Rawlsian test of justice.67 Sen believes that this is not the right question.  He states: 
“Even if the poor were to get just a little richer, this need not imply that the poor are 
getting a fair share of the benefits of economic interrelations and of the vast potentials 
of globalization. Nor is it adequate to ask whether international inequality is getting 
marginally larger, or smaller.”68 
He continues:  
To rebel against the appalling poverty and the staggering inequalities that 
characterize the contemporary world, or to protest against unfair sharing of 
benefits of global cooperation, it is not necessary to show that the inequality is 
not only very large, but it is also getting larger.69 
Sen sets out the issue from an economic perspective as follows. 
When there are gains from cooperation, there can be many alternative 
arrangements that benefit each party…. It is necessary, therefore, to ask 
whether the distribution of gains is fair or acceptable, and not just whether 
there exist some gains for all parties (which can be the case for a great many 
alternative arrangements). As J.F. Nash, the mathematician and game theorist, 
discussed more than half a century ago…the central issue is not whether a 
particular arrangement is better for all than no cooperation at all (there can be 
many such alternatives), but whether the particular divisions to emerge are fair 
divisions, given the alternative arrangements that can be made.70 
And on this point he concludes there is no doubt that international trade as it now is 
conducted is far from fair.  
 
66 Amartya Sen Interdependence And Global Justice http://www.un.org/esa/documents/GLO-
UNGA.pdf 
67 Theory of Justice (1971) 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid. 
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A positivist analysis by economist Steven Suranovic indicates that fairness can be 
considered to have two principles: equality and reciprocity.71 More particularly, with 
respect to trade, Suranovic claims the two principles may be considered as having 
seven dimensions: 
 
1. Non-Discrimination Fairness,  
2. Distributional Fairness,  
3. Golden-Rule Fairness,  
4. Positive Reciprocity,  
5. Negative Reciprocity,  
6. Privacy Fairness and  
7. Maximum Benefit Fairness.   
 
We will deal briefly with each in turn.  Non-Discrimination Fairness, requires equals 
to be treated equally.  Any right granted or duty imposed on one party is equally 
available or imposed on the other.72 Distributional Fairness, requires goods (and 
evils) to be distributed equally among equal members. It is a fairness evaluated on 
outcomes: that is the outcome of any distribution must ensure that each party or group 
receives an amount equal in some way.73 Golden-Rule Fairness, says Suranovic, 
requires that no action be taken unless the actor is willing to be subjected to the same 
action.74 Positive Reciprocity, permits parties to act so as to gain a benefit from a 
 
71 S. Suranovic, “A Positive Analysis of Fairness with Applications to International Trade,” The World 
Economy, March 2000, 283-307.  Suranovic’s article is an interesting analysis of fairness an includes 
examples of each type of fairness in international trade.  It is too brief in its legal analysis but that is to 
be expected given its objective of categorizing and developing a positive analysis of fairness in trade. 
72 Ibid, 288. 
73 Ibid, 290.  For a more detailed and nuanced discussion, see my discussion of outcomes in Sheehy 
above n. 47. 
74 Ibid, 291. 
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receiving party equal to one bestowed on that other.75 Negative Reciprocity, permits 
retaliation in kind and quantity in response to a harm done.76 Privacy Fairness 
permits parties to act freely insofar as their actions affect only themselves. Actions 
which impede this expression of freedom are deemed “unfair.”77 Maximum Benefit 
Fairness requires that when a range of benefits are available from an action but only 
one outcome can be chosen, the outcome selected must be the one most beneficial in 
the aggregate.78 From this brief overview, one can see the legitimacy of the Oxfam, 
Sen and the host of developing nation complaints. 
 
If one is committed to the principle of the equality of humans as members of the same 
species, a view that informs the UN Charter of Human Rights, one of the most 
universally accepted explanations of humanity on the planet, one of the primary 
concerns must be the development and protection of the means of human sustenance. 
Thus, where institutions, systems and rules support a distribution that fosters their 
sustenance, one can argue conclusively that the institutions, systems and rules are fair.  
Logically, where institutions, systems and rules support a distribution that undermines 
people’s ability to sustain themselves, one can argue conclusively that the institutions, 
systems and rules are unfair 
 
5) POLITICS OF TRADE: USA FOREIGN POLICY 
 
The history of wealthy northern nations conquering and controlling poorer southern 
nations is both well known and uncontroversial.  The interests of those who lived in 
 
75 Ibid, 295. 
76 Ibid, 299. 
77 Ibid, 301. 
78 Ibid, 302. 
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those poor southern nations were disregarded and the countries were essentially 
treated as treasury supports for their European masters.  This view of the world, of the 
developed northern nations, “right and destiny” to conquer and dominate the rest of 
the world, however, has carried on long after the collapse of the European empires.  
This is particularly true in the case of the USA.   
 
It has been said: “One can colonize by trade or conquest.”  The USA has combined 
these two methods masterfully.  As documented carefully by historian Howard Zinn, 
USA’s aggressive foreign policy has been driven by its economic interests.  He quotes 
Senator Beveridge of 1897 when American foreign policy was still shaping: 
“American factories are making more than the American people can use. American 
soil is producing more than they can consume.  Fate has written our policy for us; the 
trade of the world must and shall be ours.”79 
America took the policy to its logical military conclusion quite early.  Perhaps it is 
wise to consider America’s policies in their historical context.  One of America’s 
most visionary presidents, (often considered to be among the most humanitarian with 
respect to foreign affairs,) Woodrow Wilson offered:  “Concessions obtained by 
financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of 
unwilling nations be outraged in the process…”80 He made it perfectly clear that the 
voluntariness of trade partners was not a consideration.  He stated: “the doors of the 
nations which are closed must be battered down.”81 Elsewhere, this same enlightened 
 
79 H. Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, p. 292. 
80 Speech at Columbia University, 1907, quoted in H. Zinn, ibid, p. 353. 
81 Ibid.  This view echoes uncannily the British foreign policy of the nineteenth century. See comment 
of Lord Shelburne above n. 13. 
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president explained his intention to force trade on the rest of the world which he 
described as “the righteous conquest of foreign markets.”82 
This approach to foreign policy was carried forward after the end of the Second 
World War.  In setting up the post-WWII world, the USA supported the pre-war 
division of the world among developed countries which were to be served by their 
third world colonies.  The USA thoughtfully reserved Latin America to itself.83 Lest 
these discussion and facts be considered outdated or a sentiment peculiar to a 
particular president, consider G.H. Bush’s concern to protect USA oil supplies in 
Kuwait claiming that the USA was restoring democracy in the clan bound, autocratic 
kingdom, or Madeline Albright’s comments to the UN Security Council concerning 
the Clinton Administration’s desire to act against Iraq: “[the US will] behave, with 
others, multilaterally when we can and unilaterally as we must.”84 In 2002 US Trade 
Representative Ambassador Robert Zoellick has put it plainly: “America's trade 
policies are connected to our broader economic, political, and security aims.”85 
Zoellick acknowledged that it lacks intellectual coherence.  He wrote: “This 
intellectual integration may confound some trade scholars.”86 Nevertheless, he makes 
USA’s policy abundantly clear: “To be sustainable at home, our trade strategy needs 
to be aligned with America's values and aspirations -- as well as with our economic 
interests.”87 
82 Ibid.  
83 N. Chomsky, Profits over people, neoliberalism and global order, 1999, p. 22-23. 
84 In 1994.  
85 http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0803/ijpe/pj81zoellick.htm 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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As mentioned, the US has done so continually by two methods: the first and obvious 
which we are currently seeing in Iraq,88 a policy of invasion of sovereign nations89 
and subversion of democratically elected governments,90 and second, by means of 
terms of trade, whether through protectionism or embargoes against whomever it 
chooses. 
 
Because of the political unpopularity of foreign invasions for commercial purposes 
particularly among the lower and middle classes conscripted to fight and die for those 
commercial interests,91 and its myths of equality, self-determination, and 
democracy,92 the USA has been reluctant to overtly invade and conquer.93 The 
exception of course, has been with respect to the aboriginal nations who lived in 
North America prior to the European invasion, which after the establishment of the 
USA were subject to constant invasions and concerted efforts and policies of 
genocide.94 
Given the outcry disclosure about economic motives for its wars would create for the 
government and corporations guiding the USA military adventures,95 they must 
continue to mask both domestically and internationally their motives, regardless of the 
 
88 Among the first pieces of “legislation” created by the Coalition Provisional Authority was a new 
trade regime in which Iraq was open to international trade on terms very liberal to the USA.  The final 
outcome of this “legislation” is unknown at the time of this writing as according to international law an 
occupying power has no legal right to create laws dealing with international relations. 
89 See Rice above, n. 13. 
90 For a comprehensive review of the USA’s violent and covert interventions see, W. Blum, Killing 
Hope: U.S. military and CIA interventions since World War II, (1995). 
91 Ibid. 
92 J. Kane, Virtue and Power: The Perennial Dilemma of US Foreign Policy. 
93 Although it has no qualms about doing so covertly.  For a comprehensive review of the USA’s 
violent and covert interventions see, W. Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. military and CIA interventions since 
World War II, (1995). For discussion, see J. Garrison, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue 
Power? (2004).  One can see this same ambiguity among contemporary scholars and commentators 
with respect to speaking of the USA's empire.  See, for example, Robert Kaplan who favours speaking 
of the USA empire. 
94 See Zinn above n. 63. 
95 See for example, Zinn, “A People’s War?”  Chapter 16 above n. 63, p. 398 ff. 
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international ridicule their patent falsehoods may draw.  Instead of forthrightness, the 
USA tends to rely on its trade laws.96 As former Commissioner of Australian Trade 
Practices Commission, Professor Warren Pengilley, observes, “Because it [USA] had 
no widespread territorial base upon which to enact protective trade legislation, the 
United States sought in its laws to enact legislation principles never previously a part 
of international law.”97 
A favourite cover for USA motives, is the oft repeated pretext of “national security”.   
For example, its embargo of Cuba was advanced on “national security” grounds.  It 
was so transparently ridiculous, that a Mexican diplomat explained his country’s 
refusal to support the embargo by saying “if we publicly declare that Cuba is a threat 
to our security forty million Mexicans will die laughing.”98 Indeed, the USA 
instigated the Cuban problem by imposing sanctions against Cuba’s sugar exports—
its main cash crop export, to which Cuba responded by confiscating USA property.99 
This approach is reflected in its laws concerning foreign commerce, and in particular 
its “effects,” “personal extension” and “contractual submission” doctrines.100 Each of 
these legal doctrines is a transparent attempt to extend USA laws beyond territorial or 
jurisdictional limits otherwise recognized by international law.  These laws serve to 
advance USA foreign policy, particularly, the export of USA’s values101 as well as its 
 
96 Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 195 
97 Ibid, p. 195 
98 Quoted in Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution, (1990) 33.  
99 Story, “Property in International Law: Need Cuba Compensate US Titleholders for Nationalizing 
their Property?” (1998) 6 The J. of Pol. Phil. 306-333.  The same should be noted with respect to the 
“Cuban Missile Crisis” which was initiated by the USA’s deployment of several hundred missiles 
along the USSR’s southern front just inside the Turkish border.  In response to that initiative, the USSR 
sought to have its missiles placed in Cuba. 
100 Discussed in Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 194-204 
101 D. Sanger, “U.S. Is Exporting Its Free-Market Values through Global Commercial Agreements.” 
NY Times 17 Feb, 1997 
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economic interests.    Despite its free market rhetoric, USA trade policy is anything 
but free trade. Consider, for example, that under the supposed liberalization of trade 
under Reagan.102 In the Reagan era the USA implemented three times more 
protectionist policies than any other developed country.103 As Pengilley observes, one 
cannot neatly divide foreign policy, trade and competition.104 
In his enlightening and powerful article, “United States Self Interest: A Major 
Impediment to Agreement on the Principles of International Competition and its 
Enforcement,”105 Pengilley, has demonstrated amply the USA does nothing but 
advance its self-interests usually with just those same policies.  It is not being argued 
that the USA should act contrary to its self-interest, but that it should take a broader 
perspective of its self-interest and consider reciprocity as an important principle in its 
foreign policy.106 As Pengilley observes, the USA “has a plethora of statutes aimed at 
advancing its cause to the detriment of its competitors.” 107 This approach is rather 
surprising as it occurs despite the supposed lessons from the Great Depression and in 
particular, the problem associated with the beggar-thy-neighbour policies.108 
This use of law, clearly contrary to economic good, seems particularly inappropriate 
for a nation committed to the Rule of Law.  But this is not the only odd or 
contradictory use of law by the self-proclaimed beacon of the Rule of Law.  Indeed 
congress created laws purporting to give the USA international jurisdiction contrary 
 
102 Noted, for example, by J. Stiglitz, as a major promoter of free trade in Stiglitz, above n. 11, p. 13. 
103 Patrick Low  Trading Free: The GATT and U.S. Trade Policy, 1995. 
104 Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 202 
105 Ibid, p. 195. 
106 See Rice above n. 13 for expression of the USA position and explanation for the rejection of this 
view. 
107 Ibid. 
108 This may be another example of what Gore Vidal is concerned about in his work appropriately titled 
The United States of Amnesia.  But see the actual nature of these supposed lessons in Chang above n. 
5. 
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to well recognized and accepted international law109 and the courts have upheld these 
doctrines of extraterritoriality.  Perhaps the classic case, although later modified in 
response to world opprobrium,110 is the judgment in US. v. Aluminum Co. of 
America111 in which the court stated: “Any state may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not with its allegiance for conduct outside its borders that has consequences 
within its border which the state reprehends.”112 
These USA claims of jurisdiction are widely, and with good reason, regarded as 
imperialistic:113 when other countries have attempted to enact reciprocating legislation 
the USA has refused to recognize such legislation.114 Pengilley concludes “The 
United States has, to date, used its world trading position, and the necessity for 
virtually the whole world to trade with it, as a basis both for enacting self-interested 
legislation and subjecting the trading world to it.”115 
In light of this information and perspective with respect to USA foreign policy, we 
may ask: was Australia entitled to believe it would receive any special treatment in 
the Australia-USA FTA based on friendship?   There are two ways to develop an 
answer to the question.  First, one can examine the actual negotiations and outcome of 
the negotiations in the FTA.  Second, one can examine the outcome in terms of 
economics and in particular ecological economics.  
 
109 For discussion, see M. Shaw, International Law, 4th ed. (2004), pp. 483-490.  See also Pengilley, 
above n. 29, p. 195 
110 See discussion in Shaw, id, p. 484 f. 
111 148 F. 2d 416 (1945).  
112 Id, p. 443. 
113 Ibid, 188. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid 228. 
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6) THE AUSTRALIA-USA FTA 
 
United States twice made overtures to Australia for Free Trade Agreement, and both 
times it was rejected.116 Nevertheless, on 14 November, 2002, Australia instigated117 
negotiations with the United States for a bi-lateral trade deal.118 In October 2004, 
Australia entered the Free Trade Agreement.  The speed with which agreement was 
reached seems to have surprised Australians.119 
Australia considers itself a friend of the USA.  As Prime Minister John Howard 
repeatedly advised Australians that the FTA was based on the “friendship” or a 
“special relationship” between the countries.  Indeed, the trade agreement was 
premised to a certain degree on this notion.  Such advice, however, should be taken 
with a note of caution.   
 
a) Friends & Interests in International Relations 
Lord Palmerston, defending his foreign policy in the House of Commons in the mid-
nineteenth century remarked, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual 
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to 
follow."120 This perspective continues to inform foreign policy among contemporary 
nation states, and certainly includes the USA.  Clearly, one must put such quaint 
notions as friendship aside and leave them for the popular press.  Indeed, the reality of 
 
116 Weiss and Thurbon, above n., 14, p. 6. 
117 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 6 June 2002, Hansard 501-515 
http://sievx.com/testimony/20020606FADT.pdf
118 The problems associated with bi-lateral and unilateral FTA’s vis-à-vis  the international trading 
system are simply explained in J. Bhagwati, R. Garnaut “Say No To This Free Trade Deal” The 
Australian, July 11, 2003. 
119 Weiss, above n. 14, p. 2. 
120 Parliamentary Debates (3d ser.) 122 (1848), quoted in Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of 
Quotations Requested From the Congressional Research Service 10 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989). 
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the situation, was made evident in parliament when the member from Murray-Darling 
pointed out how the USA’s “enemy,” Cuba, has a better market access for its sugar 
than does Australia.121 Such talk is merely governments obfuscating an issue that 
ought to be thoroughly and thoughtfully debated in public.  That aside, what has been 
the basis for or justification of the FTA? 
 
b) Economic Benefits 
Australia purportedly wanted to enter the FTA to avoid being overtaken by other 
tropical countries, particularly in Latin America, particularly with respect to its trade 
in agriculture.122 Initially, the Australian government claimed gains, in the 
neighbourhood of $4 billion per annum over a ten year period.123 Access to USA 
markets for Australian agricultural products were used to promote support for the 
FTA.124 The Australian government boasted that 66% of agricultural tariffs would be 
eliminated immediately, and a further 9% reduced to zero within four years.125 The 
Australian government also claimed elimination of 97% of US tariff lines in non-
agricultural exports (but, textiles and clothing would not be included).126 Access to 
USA government procurement market was also touted as a benefit,127 as was access 
for Australian service providers.128 
121 Mr. Peter Black Urgent Motion, AUSTRALIA-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT SUGAR INDUSTRY EXCLUSION, NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard 17/02/2004 
Page: 6177. 
122 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 6 June 2002, Hansard 501-515 
http://sievx.com/testimony/20020606FADT.pdf
123 Black above n. 98. 
124 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Advancing Australian Agricultural Exports,” p. 2 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/fact_sheets/Agriculture.pdf
125 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 
“Advancing Australia’s Economic Future,” p. 1. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid.  
128 Ibid. 
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It is interesting to note how these benefits are evaluated by economists.  The 
Australian government commissioned report, conducted by the Centre for 
International Economics (CIE) suggested significantly larger GDP gains of $6.1 
billion per annum for the period 2005-2015.129 This projection amounts to a $61 
billion gain in the GNP for the period.  Alternative modelling, however, based on 
econometrics presents a dramatically different outcome. Indeed, the study prepared by 
the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR), indicates a 
potential change to the Australian economy of -$47 billion over the same period.130 
The depth and breadth of the NIEIR study and its criticisms levelled against the CIE 
study incline one to accept the NIEIR’s view of the matter.131 
On the USA side, The Wall Street Journal called the pact a “no brainer” as USA is 
already running a $9 billion surplus on $28 billion of trade with Australia.132 Further, 
as Senator Grassley of the USA Finance Committee observed it will immediately 
eliminate Australian industrial tariffs on 99% of products.133 The only USA objection 
to the FTA came from labour and certain special interest groups like agriculture and 
textiles.134 The USA also emphasized the benefit to its agricultural industries which 
export $400 million to Australia as part of the duty free goods resulting from the 
 
129 Centre for International Economics, “Economic analysis of AUSFTA: Impact of the bilateral free 
trade agreement with the United States” http://www.intecon.com.au/reports/AUSFTA.pdf
129 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 6 June 2002, Hansard 501-515 
http://sievx.com/testimony/20020606FADT.pdf
130 National Institute of Economic and Industry Research, “An assessment of the direct impact of the 
Australian-United States Free Trade Agreement on Australian trade, economic activity and the costs of 
the loss of national sovereignty.”  May 2004 http://www.aftinet.org.au/campaigns/nier.pdf
131 A pessimistic estimation of the impact of the FTA was made by business leaders in Australia as 
well. See Weiss above n. 14, p. 144-145.  One cannot but recall G.B. Shaw’s comment: “If all the 
economists were laid end to end, they still would not reach a conclusion.”  Nevertheless, one would 
like to think that the profession has made some advances since Shaw’s time. 
132 “A-Waltzing Free Trade” New York, N.Y.: May 20, 2004. pg. A.12 
133 Floor Statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley on S. 2610, the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act July 15, 2004  http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2004/prg071504a.pdf
134 Wall St. J. above n 109. 
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FTA.135 USA estimates were that the FTA with Australia will increase USA exports 
by approximately $2 billion per annum.136 The basis for claiming the agreement is so 
one-sided will be examined next. 
 
c) The Agreement  
Australia had a number of objectives and concerns in negotiating the FTA.  
Australia’s science based quarantine which has kept Australia’s agriculture industry 
free of significant pests,137 was a concern that Australia wished to protect.138 
In the negotiations, Australia was not able to keep its quarantine measures in place.  
The USA demanded and received concessions from Australia claiming that the 
quarantine measures were non-tariff barriers to trade and not proven by USA science.  
Australia lost.   
 
Australia has a Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) that makes medicines 
available to Australians at low cost.139 Australia was promised by its government that 
the FTA would not effect the PBS.  The USA framed the PBS as an impediment to the 
USA’s pharmaceutical industry’s competition in the Australian market.  It therefore 
demanded and received as a concession from Australia changes to the PBS which will 
have far reaching negative effects for the average Australian.  
 
135 Office of the United States Trade Representative “Bilateral and Regional Negotiation” 2004 Trade 
Policy Agenda and 2003 Annual Report 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Trade_Policy_Agenda
/asset_upload_file392_4753.pdf
136 Office of the United States Trade Representative “Summary of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement Free Trade "Down Under"” 02/08/2004 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/Summary_of_the_U.S.-
Australia_Free_Trade_Agreement.html
137 Chapter 7 Sanitary and Phytosantiary Measures, discussed in Weiss  above n. 14, p. 35-44 
138 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 6 June 2002, Hansard 501-515 
http://sievx.com/testimony/20020606FADT.pdf
139 The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme will be seriously damaged by being excluded from the Annex 
2-C.  A fuller explanation is available in Weiss above n. 14, p. 63-68. 
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Further, Australia maintained a policy of supporting domestic industry which 
benefited Australia – much like its American counterpart “Made in USA” policy – 
and was an important part of Australia’s national economic policy.140 This policy too 
came up for scrutiny in the negotiations.  The USA demanded and received 
concessions putting an end to this policy. 
 
Finally, up until the FTA negotiations, Australia followed its own intellectual 
property polices which were in line with international standards.  Nevertheless, it gave 
in to USA demands for “evergreening”141 intellectual property laws—laws which 
extend copyrights and patents by permitting dubious patent applications by current 
patent holders which work to thwart generic competitors.  This later provision ensures 
an extended stream of royalties will flow into the USA for years after they would 
normally have ceased.142 In sum, Australia failed to achieve its objectives in four 
vital areas: quarantine, medicines, government procurement, and intellectual property. 
 
Despite these significant failures, certainly it should be expected that rationality 
would prevail with respect to the more obvious, less controversial items—items of 
trade which form the basis for arguments for trade.  While certainly tropical fruits 
could be grown anywhere including the polar regions (given enough energy inputs in 
matters of light, heat, and fertilizer, much as one can make icebergs in the tropics), it 
does not take an economist to realize that it is a misallocation of resources to do so.  
Australia is a tropical and semi-tropical continent.  As such, its citrus and sugar 
industries constitute a significant proportion of its agricultural produce.  It would be 
 
140 Chapter 15. 
141 Article 17.20.4 
142 Weiss above, n. 14, p. 116. 
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instructive therefore to examine how these products faired in the FTA.  The case of 
sugar will be examined, with the caveat that while it is not necessarily a typical 
example of how goods were dealt with between these two developed nations, it serves 
as an exemplar of the nature of the problem which is the focus of the balance of this 
paper. 
 
7) CASE STUDY: SUGAR 
In Australia and the USA various studies were undertaken to estimate the losses and 
gains which could result from truly free trade between the two nations’ peoples with 
respect to sugar.  On the Australian side, potential gains from reduced tariffs on sugar 
were estimated at $4 billion.143 Although not unaware of the USA sugar subsidies 
and restrictions, it was indicated in preliminary discussions to the Australian Senate 
Subcommittee that agriculture including exports of sugar144 to the USA were open to 
negotiation.  This openness was certainly important to Australia as Minister Vaile had 
declared that access to USA markets for agriculture and sugar in particular were 
specific objectives.145 Neo-liberal Prime Minister John Howard adamantly asserted 
that sugar would not be excluded from the FTA.  His assertions proved not to be true 
and the USA announced in February 2004 that its sugar industry would not be 
effected.146 USA sugar producers had indicated to USA negotiators that granting 
 
143 Mr. Neville Newell, member for Tweed, Urgent Motion, NSW Legislative Assembly Hansard 
“Australia-Untied States of America Free Trade Agreement Sugar Industry Exclusion” 17/02/2004 p. 
6177. 
144 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee 6 June 2002 at 511. 
145 Media Release, Vaile Announces Objectives for Australia - US FTA Monday, 3 March 2003 - 
MVT13/2003 http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2003/mvt013_03.html
146 The concern about sugar was one reason that Australia had refused the previous overtures.  The 
announcement was made by Office of the United States Trade Representative “Summary of the U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement Free Trade "Down Under"” 02/08/2004 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/Summary_of_the_U.S.-
Australia_Free_Trade_Agreement.html
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Australian access to USA markets would likely destroy their industry costing 66,000 
jobs, which if expanded to the sweetener industry would encompass 226,000 jobs.147 
Before looking at the specifics of the FTA negotiations, it is worthwhile to review the 
historical and global background to the international sugar trade and the respective 
domestic environments of both the USA and Australia. 
 
Over the course of sugar’s long history as part of human civilization it has changed 
from a luxury item to a basic food commodity.148 Sugar is among the world’s most 
commonly traded, imported and regulated commodities.  The global sugar market is 
in excess of 119 million tonnes per annum.149 The five main exporters are the EU, 
Brazil, Australia, Thailand, and Cuba.150 It is often commented that the sugar market 
is the most distorted market among the world’s commodities151 with approximately a 
third sold pursuant to special arrangements, meaning, outside of a free market.152 
Sugar, as a commodity has experienced considerable volatility largely related to 
government interventions, on the world markets.153 In the last two decades it has 
ranged from $0.404 in 1985154 to $0.1344 in 1995155 per pound. 
 
147 Submission of the American Sugar Alliance, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
United States Department of labor, Request for Public Comment on Review of the Employment Impact 
of the Proposed U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, p. 1-3. 
148 See, Ray Burke, The Bee, the Reed, The Root: The History of Sugar (1997) 
http://class.georgiasouthern.edu/fl/sugar/sugar-b.htm 
149 Won W. Koo “Major Issues for the U.S. Sugar Industry” in Linda M. Young, James B. Johnson, and 
Vincent H. Smith, eds. 2000 WTO Negotiations: Issues for Agriculture in the Northern Plains and 
Rockies, (1999) at 89.  Koo’s figure is based older data.  A rough calculation based on USDA statistics 
for the years 1995-2002 would indicate a slightly larger market averaging 126 million tonnes per year.  
http://usda2.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/specialty/89019/tab-01.xls
150 Ibid., 91. 
151 Donald Mitchell,  “Sugar Policies: Opportunity for Change,” Development Prospects Group, The 
World Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3222, Feb 2004, p. 6. Noted also by J. 
Roney, “The U.S. sugar industry: Large, efficient, and challenged,” 106 International Sugar Journal 
(2004) 315, at 321.  Although an industry journal, the discussion here is a helpful summary. 
152 Queensland Sugar Corporation, Sugarnotes (1997), p. 40.  
153 N. Arguea, R. Harper, “Linkages in US and World Sugar Futures Contracts” 20(4) Managerial 
Finance 25-37 (1994). 
154 Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture Sugar and Sweetener Yearbook 
(89019) tab 02 http://usda2.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/specialty/89019/tab-03.xls 
155 Ibid.  
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a) USA Sugar Programs and Policies 
Sugar in the USA is governed by a complex legal regime156 which maintains a 
number of supports for the local sugar industry.  These supports are a complex of 
import taxes,157 special loans,158 market supports, and marketing fee assessments.159 
The import taxes amount to approximately 100% of the cost of raw sugar as measured 
against the Caribbean raw sugar price, (which is usually considered the base price).160 
Commitments by the USA government to date have been to reduce import taxes on 
second tier-duty (the tier after a quota has been filled) for raw cane sugar to $0.1582 
per pound and $0.1621 per pound for refined sugar.161 The USA operates both 
internal supports and external subsidies for its sugar industry.  Government subsidies 
cost the USA consumers between $800 million and $1.9 billion per annum.162 
Although the USA itself is also a major producer, its total sugar production is 
insufficient for the demands of its domestic market.  As a result of this insufficient 
production combined with the distortions caused by the USA government’s subsidy 
programs by which it acquires domestically produced sugar, the USA is in the bizarre 
position of having large quantities of sugar to dump on the world market, while its 
importers bring in 1.25 million tons of sugar annually.163 
156 From the 1949 Agriculture Act, s. 206 establishing the sugar regime, to the 1985 Food Security Act, 
to the repeal of s. 206 under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, 1996, s. 701, to the 
most recent changes pursuant to the 2002 Farm Bill. 
http://www.taxpayer.net/agriculture/learnmore/factsheets/TCSSugarCommodityFactSheet_2003.pdf 
157 US Dept. of Ag. Econ. Res. Serv. Referred to in Koo, above n. 126, p. 94. 
158 Through the Commodity Credit Corporation  
159 Koo, above n. 126, p. 94-5. 
160 Ibid, p. 92.  
161 Ibid, p 96. 
162 M. Grunwald, “When in doubt, blame Big Sugar” The Washington Post June 25, 2002. 
163 S. Salisbury, “Trade Fight not over for citrus, sugar” Palm Beach Post, Nov. 22, 2003. Set at 1.13 in 
1997, Sugarnotes, above n. 129, p. 44. 
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Economists’ modelling leads them to estimate that without these supports and 
subsidies that the world sugar prices would increase by a dramatic 61%,164 effectively 
transferring the majority of the gain to the major, poor southern producers. 
 
With respect to production, USA growers produced $960 million worth of sugar in 
2003.165 Among its states, subtropical Florida is a major sugar producer.  The 
efficiency of cane growth in subtropical areas, however, is questionable: Florida cane 
growers produce approximately 1/3 to ¼ of the amount per acres of growers in 
tropical climates. 166 Florida yields are approximately 34.5 tons of cane per acre.167 
b) Australia Sugar Programs and Policies 
Australia too has a significant sugar industry with a long history including at times, 
considerable government intervention.168 Sugar production is spread along some 
2,100 kms of Australia’s eastern coast in the states of Queensland and New South 
Wales,169 with the former accounting for 94% of the production and the latter 5%.170 
Australian exports supply about 12% of the world market.171 The Australian 
government first enacted legislation to comply with the International Sugar 
 
164 M. Benirschka, W. Koo and J. Lou, World Sugar Policy Simulation Model: Description and 
Computer Program Documentation.” Dept. of Ag. Econ. Ag. Econ. Report 356, N. Dakota State Univ. 
1996. 
165 USDA Crop Values 2003 Summary at 35. http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/price/zcv-
bb/cpvl0204.pdf 
166 J.R. Magness, G.M. Markle, C.C. Compton. 1971. Food and feed crops of the United States. 
Interregional Research Project IR-4, IR Bul. 1 (Bul. 828 New Jersey Agr. Expt. Sta.). 
http://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/Crops/Sugar_cane.html
167 Based on figures from USDA/ERS publication #SSSV20N2, June 1995; estimated production, 
1995-1996 table in Robert J.  Meagher, Jr., USDA/ARS, Insect Attractants, Behavior and Basic 
Biology Laboratory, Gainesville, Florida Radcliffe’s IPM World Textbook 
http://ipmworld.umn.edu/chapters/meagher.htm
168 K. Walker and K. Crowley, Australian Environmental Policy 2, (1999) 88-90. 
169 Sugarnotes , p. 8.  
170 Sugar Research Limited,  http://www.sri.org.au/sugarindustry2.html 
171 Queensland Sugar Corporation, Sugarnotes, (1997) p. 1. 
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Agreement of the 1930’s.172 Subsequently, the commonwealth and Queensland state 
governments negotiated an embargo on the importation of white sugar which pursuant 
to the Queensland Sugar Agreements lasted until 1989.173 Since that time there has 
been a successive reduction on tariffs.174 In terms of Australia’s export market, sugar 
is its second most important crop, following wheat.175 
The sugar export market is operated exclusively by the Queensland Sugar 
Corporation, a state operated enterprise established pursuant to legislation.176 
Queensland exports about 80% of its raw sugar and has receipts of about AUD$2.0 
billion, per annum.177 Although Australia abolished its embargo on imported sugar, it 
too continues to protect its sugar industry, with a tariff at a rate of $38 per tonne.178 
Annual production is approximately 5.0 million tonnes.179 
Given its tropical climate, Australia’s sugar production is efficient.  Yield is 
approximately 80-100 tonnes of cane per acre.180 Prior to the FTA, Australia’s sugar 
quota with the USA was 87,000 tonnes—the equivalent of two boatloads per 
annum.181 USA producers realized that if Australian producers were granted a level 
playing field, Australians would sell a much larger proportion of their sugar crop to 
the USA and destroy the USA sugar industry.182 Accordingly, they lobbied the 
 
172 Leading to International Sugar Agreement opened for signature London, 1-24 December 1958. 
173 Sugarnotes above n. 129, p. 4, 48. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid, p. 5. 
176 Sugar Industry Act, 1999, Qld. 
177 Id.  
178 Sugarnotes, above n. 129, p. 46.  
179 Ibid, p. 45.  
180 Ibid, p. 11 
181 Black, above n. 98. 
182 American Sugar Alliance “Proposed Free Trade Agreement Negotiations Between the United States 
and Australia: Advice Concerning Probable Economic Effect” submissions to United States 
International Trade Commission Hearing: Investigation Nos. TA-131-24 and TA-2104-04 Washington 
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government which succumbing to pressure to protect USA domestic corporate 
producers simply refused to grant Australia a level playing field.  As a result, 
Australia did not improve by one iota access for one of its major agricultural export 
products: sugar.  Sugar is explicitly and completely excluded from the FTA,183 and 
Australia, despite its rather dramatic concessions, continues to be limited to its quota 
of a mere two boatloads—exactly the same as before the FTA. 
 
8) EVALUATING THE FTA FOR FAIRNESS 
 
Having demonstrated a considerable number of losses, economically, and 
ecologically, are there other justifications that need to be considered before engaging 
in an evaluation of the FTA for fairness? 
 
a) Benefits and explanations 
The Australian government claims that one of the main motivations for the FTA was 
its political and military alliance with the USA – already made firm by the ANZUS 
treaty.  The incumbent Prime Minister emphasizes the USA’s role in defeating the 
Pacific’s imperial power, Japan, in the Second World War.184 This argument seems 
weak if not altogether specious.  Surely, there are no powers in the Pacific greater 
 
D.C. Jan. 21, 2003. 1-2, See also Submission of the American Sugar Alliance, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, United States Department of labor, Request for Public Comment on 
Review of the Employment Impact of the Proposed U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, p. 1-3. 
183 United States - Australia Free Trade Agreement, Final Text, s. 2 National Treatment and Market 
Access for Goods, Annex 2-B Tariff Elimination, Schedule of Australia, Ch. 17. 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-text/Annex2b_Tariff_Elimination/Annex_2-
B_Australia_Tariff_Schedule.pdf 
184 Paul Sheehan, in the January 2003 Sydney Morning Herald, quotes a Howard advisor: "The PM 
[believes that]  If one day we ever have to face a militant Indonesia, we've only got one ally[USA]  
who can do the job." 
http://reg.smh.com.au/login.do?status=FAIL&errMsg=&errCode=10001&site=SMH&server=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.smh.com.au&data=%2Farticles%2F2003%2F02%2F05%2F1044318667099.html%3Fo
neclick%3Dtrue&count=0 
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than Australia with the exceptions of China and Japan.  Japan, however, has given up 
its imperial designs and its constitution expressly forbids the development of an 
offensive military force.185 And China is more than sufficiently occupied with its 
domestic and regional problems including Taiwan, Tibet, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan all of which border on the Xinjiang Province, 
not to mention the troubles it has had with India and Vietnam on the outside186 and 
other ethnic groups within. In the most unlikely event that China were to invade 
Australia, it is very difficult to imagine the USA becoming involved, particularly 
since China is the leading foreign buyer of USA Treasury Bonds second only to 
Japan.187 
Were any lesser power to attack and were Australia unable to repel it, the United 
States would intervene in any such situation on account of its own interests188—
indeed, the aggressiveness and complete disregard for the rights and interests of other 
sovereign nations is one of the main complaints brought against the USA.189 
185 The Japanese Constitution reads: “Chapter II Renunciation of War, Article 9 (1) Aspiring sincerely 
to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of aggression of the state will not be recognized.” 
Trans. from Universität Bern Institut für Öffentliches Recht) 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ja00000_.html#A009_ 
186 See, for example, the analysis George Lindsey, Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Institute for 
Strategic Studies and former Chief of Operations Research of the Department of National Defence in 
George Lindsey, “Should China Be Contained Or Engaged?” 6(2) NATIONAL NETWORK NEWS 
(1999),  http://www.dann.ca/Backissues/nn6-2_10.html
187 United States Treasury, indicates that China holds $196 bn second only to Japan at $707 bn. 
“MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES”  http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt 
188 The USA maintains at least installations at Woomera, http://cicg.free.fr/diremp/usmili.htm and its 
involvement in Pine Gap although not an installation, is notorious as is its presence in Nurungar first 
disclosed to the Australian public in Des Ball, A Base for Debate The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar 
(1987) See also A. Broinowski “No US Bases in Australia, Says Myers” ASEAN Focus Group, (Feb. 
2004) chronicles the recent political pronouncements concerning US military bases in Australia . 
http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?articleID=709
189 See for example the discussion in Shaw, above n. ??? 
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Given Australia’s rejection of two prior approaches for an FTA by the USA, there 
was some concern about the priority USA would accord to Australia.190 Despite 
much assurance from Mr. Deady of the Department of Trade that it was an important 
agreement receiving full attention from the USA, the USA’s Office of the Trade 
Representative mentions the Australian FTA in a mere paragraph while extolling the 
coup of other agreements with Chile and Central America.191 
Other parties in favour of the FTA were the Business Council of Australia and some 
other smaller industries that have considerable trade with the USA.  The Business 
Council of Australia is made up of Australia’s largest corporations, many of which are 
controlled or at least closely tied to USA corporations.192 These corporations have no 
interest in Australia’s well-being.  These other parties have been harassed by the 
USA’s notorious and unending barrage of litigation and trade complaints to such a 
degree that an agreement with nearly no concessions but which may smooth their 
access to the USA markets is better than the current situation.193 
It would appear that Australia had already given away most of its tradable chips prior 
to entering into the negotiation.  Accordingly, it was left with nothing with which to 
extract concessions, and essentially, received none. The USA merely sat silently as 
Australia put its last available concessions on the table, then made some further 
demands with the resulting agreement as it is.  Authors of the NIEIR economic impact 
 
190 See Questions of Senator Cook in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee of the Australian 
Senate, above n. 106. 
191 The President's 2003 Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program “Regional and Bilateral 
Trade Negotiations” Ch. 3 of Report 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_Trade_Policy_Agenda
/asset_upload_file392_4753.pdf
192 Weiss above, n. 14, p, 18. 
193 Ibid, p, 17-18. 
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study observe: “the AUSFTA is a partnership of unequals.  This is likely to be 
expressed in terms of the senior partner being highly litigious towards anything 
Australia wants to do and highly arbitrary in terms of what if wants to do.”194 
A further matter for concern is Australia’s level of commitment to the FTA.  
Australia’s federal system has granted to the commonwealth government 
constitutional power to bind the individual states. Accordingly, individual Australian 
states cannot block or reject the FTA, nor can there be any changes to the agreement 
once signed.  By way of contrast, as Pengilley points out: “USA does not bind itself to 
treaties—individual states can accept or reject any trade agreements negotiated by the 
federal government, and there is therefore little, if anything, binding the USA side in a 
trade agreement.”195 Accordingly, any state can create legislation to block any aspect 
of the FTA it does not like.  Furthermore, despite its signature by the President of the 
United States, the FTA must pass Congress when the President has not been granted 
Fast Track Authority.  In such instances, Congress is free to make whatever changes it 
desires.196 
b) Analysis of Economic Fairness 
We turn now to consider economic fairness in the FTA.  FTA’s always have the 
appearance of fairness.  Quite simply, each side commits to the same language in the 
document.  Generally, the provisions governing the rights and duties of the parties are 
mirrors of one another.  Of course, then, the FTA’s must be fair, or must they?  If we 
return to consider Suranovic’s framework for analysing fairness in this FTA we will 
be able to make an informed evaluation. Of particular concern are his Positive 
 
194 Above n. 107, p. 117. 
195 Pengilley, above n., 29, p. 225-227. 
196 See discussion in Pengilley, above n. 29. 
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Reciprocity Fairness, Privacy Fairness, and  Maximum Benefit Fairness.  On none of 
these criteria can the FTA be declared a successful or fair deal. 
 
The FTA fails the Positive Reciprocity Fairness test.  This test requires that effects 
which carry a value (negative or positive) be reciprocated.  The FTA appears to be 
heavily weighted in favour of the USA which stands to gain $42 billion while leaving 
Australia with a loss of approximately $47 billion on a twenty year horizon.  The 
second aspect of the test deals with loyalty and betrayal.  Loyalty is important 
because, as Suranovic observes, it “confers benefits on other individuals or groups 
who have taken actions beneficial to you.”197 In the case at hand, Australia has 
conferred benefits on the United States, particularly by its participation in the 
unpopular Iraq invasion.  Further, positive reciprocity fairness requires that benefits 
that accrue are approximately equal.198 Again, as demonstrated above, the FTA 
certainly does not have this outcome, and most certainly not in the case of Australia’s 
second most important agricultural export, sugar.  It includes notions about the 
reciprocal diminution of tariffs.  Again, Australia gains access on many goods after a 
four year period while the USA gains immediate access for most of its goods.   
 
The mirror language of the FTA hides the real outcomes of law.  Perhaps the most 
famous illustration of this truism is Anatoile de France’s aphorism: “The law, in its 
majestic equality, forbids the rich and the poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in 
the streets, and to steal bread.”  For example, the FTA’s provisions with respect to 
intellectual property law will greatly harm Australia while greatly benefiting the USA.  
Australia is a net importer of intellectual property: the USA is a net exporter.  
 
197 Suranovic, above, n. 55, p. 295. 
198 Ibid, p. 297. 
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Australia’s efforts to increase its strength as a knowledge based economy through 
various protections and subsidies has been given away under the FTA.  The USA will 
benefit for a long time from Australia’s surrender of this precious resource. 
 
Privacy Fairness is the fairness that results from parties being able to act freely with 
respect to actions which have bearing only on themselves.  In international trade, 
Suranovic identifies this fairness as involving national sovereignty.199 As previously 
noted,200 the USA’s legal doctrines of “effects,” “personal extension” and “contractual 
submission” have the opposite intent and effect.   The costs of this submission to USA 
dominance are considerable.201 It includes USA interference with the quarantine 
system and involvement with and undermining of Australia’s pharmaceutical benefits 
scheme.  Further, the changes imposed on Australia’s intellectual property regime are 
invasive. The FTA fails this test as well. 
 
What are Australia’s options?  Clearly, it did not learn from Canada’s hard learned 
lesson with the USA from NAFTA202 nor Mexico’s with the same.203 Australia is 
stuck with the FTA the way it is. It can withdraw from the FTA only on its terms. 
 
9) CONCLUSION 
 
199 Ibid, p. 301-302. 
200 Discussed above Section 4 Politics of Trade: USA Foreign Policy and Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 
194-204 
201 The cost of the loss of sovereignty figure significantly in the NIEIR report, above n. 107. 
202 Weiss above n. 14, p. 13-17.   
203 For a full discussion chronicling the Mexican experience see J. Audley, S. Polaski, D. 
Papademetriou, and S. Vaughan, NAFTA'S PROMISE AND REALITY: Lessons from Mexico for the 
Hemisphere, 2003, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/NAFTA_Report_full.asp
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In the global picture, it is evident that small countries are not about to be treated fairly 
or equitably by the USA, and by extension, one may assume by other larger trading 
blocks.  Even in the face of obvious ecological benefits and economic harms, the 
developed nations are not about to give way to the needs or interests of the 
underdeveloped and poor.   
 
Sugar, like all agricultural products, is a very important commodity for tropical 
producers.  Much has been made of the harm done to poor countries by the current 
subsidies regime.204 For example, UNCTAD has indicated that in West Africa, the 
increase in revenues resulting from free trade would be about $1.0 billion,205 more 
than all the aid those countries receive combined.  An UNCTAD study modelling the 
relative harms and gains of duty and quota free trading regime indicates that gains to 
LDC’s (Less Developed Countries) resulting form reductions in subsidy programs 
would be dramatic while causing minimal disruption in the quad countries (USA, EU, 
Japan, and Canada).206 Nevertheless, despite the great humanitarian benefit to those 
suffering in poverty and the minimal disruption to the wealthy corporations and their 
employees, the rich countries simply refuse.207 Indeed, the developed countries 
refusal to implement their promises concerning reduction in agricultural subsidies has 
seriously undermined their credibility among trading partners on other issues.  As 
 
204 See for example, the study by B. Hoekman, F. Ng, M. Olarreaga, “Eliminating Excessive Traiffs on 
Exports of Least Developed Countries”.  World Bank Develpoment Research Group. 
205 UN General Assembly “World commodity trends and prospects” 5 Sept. 2002 A/57/381, at 5 
206 Bijit Bora, Lucian Cernat and Alessandro Turrini, Duty And Quota-Free Access For LDCs: Further 
Evidence From Cge Modelling, Policy Issues In International Trade And Commodities Study Series 
No. 14 UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/15 at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//itcdtab15_en.pdf 
207 Developed countries sometimes argue that altering the terms of trade will harm them.  (See for 
example, Commission of the European Communities, “Growth, Competitiveness, Employment,” 
(1993); World Economic Forum, World Competitiveness Report, 1994. The impact on the developed 
countries of revised terms of trade would be negligible. Krugman, above n. 16, p. 103-4. Bonapas 
Francis Onguglo Developing Countries And Unilateral Trade Preferences In The New International 
Trading System Chapter  in Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar 
(editors), Trade Rules in the Making:  Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations.  
Washington, D.C.:  The Brookings Institution Press/Organization of American States, 1999 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/sem01_e/ongugl_e.doc
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noted in the UNCTAD report prepared in 2000 “LDCs continue to face peak MFN 
rates for… sugar and sugar products.”208 
Because of its market size and dominance, there is no free trade if the markets of the 
USA are not involved.209 Poor countries who depend on their agricultural 
commodities have suffered greatly.  Commodity prices have declined over the last 
three decades and the poor countries in the tropics have borne the brunt of this 
decline.210 Although there may be some argument for maintaining national 
agricultural programs for food security policies, the reality is that these have largely 
out-lived their usefulness.  Indeed, agriculture makes up but a small fraction of 
international trade—merely 13%.211 Notwithstanding this marginal amount, wealthy 
countries are not about to give in. 
It is important to consider the significance of this refusal in terms of poverty 
reduction.  Oxfam reports: 
The human costs of unfair trade are immense. If Africa, East Asia, South Asia, 
and Latin America were each to increase their share of world exports by one 
per cent, the resulting gains in income could lift 128 million people out of 
poverty. Reduced poverty would contribute to improvements in other areas, 
such as child health and education…. 
The World Bank acknowledges that this trend continues despite the collapse of trade 
talks in Cancun in 2003.  As David de Ferranti, a World Bank Vice-President 
observed in March 2004:  
 
208 The Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Environment For Developing Country Exports: Tariff Peaks And 
Tariff Escalation UNCTAD/WTO joint study, TD/B/COM.1/14/Rev.1, 28 January 2000 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//c1d14r1.en.pdf
209 Pengilley, above n. 29, p. 211. 
210 Rigged Rules, above n. 15,  “Primary Commodities—trading into decline” Ch. 6, p. 149-174. 
211 G. Scott, ed. “Completing the Uruguay Round, 1990,” cited in M. Pryles, J. Waincymer, M. Davies, 
International Trade Law: Commentary and Materials, p. 837. 
55256-text.native.1157935488 46
Analysis by the World Bank and others indicates that major global trade opening 
in agriculture could provide a substantial boost to the developing world as a 
whole, and to many poor rural producers. Yet the existing barriers and subsidies in 
agriculture are defended by highly-entrenched lobbies in a number of the OECD 
countries.212 
Beyond these direct economic harms, scholars Michel Damian and Jean-Christophe 
Graz note, “Free trade damages the social structure in countries of the South, 
especially where women and small farmers are concerned.”213 Yet, this is the system 
increasingly being imposed on us. 
The evidence is clear:  international trade as driven by the USA214 is stacked against 
the small, the weak and the poor.  Even in the case of Australia, a developed nation 
with a “special relationship” with the USA, with all the benefits nature could bestow 
to grow tropical produce, the larger more powerful nation, the USA demonstrated no 
intention of creating a level field.  It is as if the FTA were another instance of friendly 
fire, where allies kill each other on the battle field.  Regardless of the motive and 
rhetoric, the outcome is the same. 
This rather discouraging analysis begs for resolution. What alternatives are there?  
Certainly, given the government’s misrepresentation of the situation, citizens cannot 
count on support for justice there.  It turns citizens concerned about justice back to the 
fundamental tools we have always had: citizen activism, true democracy.215 While 
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not swift, where persistent, it has always been the most effective weapon against the 
powerful elite who continue to choose to run the planet, its people and resources into 
dust for their own pitiful gains. 
